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Abstract—Orthogonal blinding based schemes for wireless phys-
ical layer security aim to achieve secure communication by
injecting noise into channels orthogonal to the main channel and
corrupting the eavesdropper’s signal reception. These methods,
albeit practical, have been proven vulnerable against multi-
antenna eavesdroppers who can filter the message from the noise.
The vulnerability is rooted in the fact that the main channel state
remains static in spite of the noise injection, which allows an
eavesdropper to estimate it promptly via known symbols and filter
out the noise. Our proposed scheme leverages a reconfigurable
antenna for Alice to rapidly change the channel state during
transmission and a compressive sensing based algorithm for her
to predict and cancel the changing effects for Bob. As a result,
the communication between Alice and Bob remains clear, whereas
randomized channel state prevents Eve from launching the known-
plaintext attack. We formally analyze the security of the scheme
against both single and multi-antenna eavesdroppers and identify
its unique anti-eavesdropping properties due to the artificially
created fast-changing channel. We conduct extensive simulations
and real-world experiments to evaluate its performance. Empirical
results show that our scheme can suppress Eve’s attack success
rate to the level of random guessing, even if she knows all the
symbols transmitted through other antenna modes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-expanding wireless technology is pushing the limit
of the network security infrastructure. Many wireless devices
need to secure the communication channels between each other
without pre-shared security context. Orthogonal blinding based
physical-layer security [1]–[6] has been widely considered as a
promising candidate to provide confidentiality during wireless
transmission without a priori key exchange. Instead of relying
on pre-shared secrets, orthogonal blinding achieves secure com-
munications by transmitting artificial noise into the null-space
of the receiver’s channel and corrupting the eavesdropper’s
reception. Its practicality supersedes other theoretical physical-
layer methods, such as zero-forcing beamforming, which relies
on knowledge about the eavesdropper’s channel. Security analy-
sis proves that it can asymptotically approach the secrecy rate of
zero-force beamforming against single-antenna eavesdroppers.
However, further studies show that orthogonal blinding is
not effective against a multi-antenna eavesdropper, who has
sufficient spatial dimensions to separate the message from the
artificial noise. Schulz and Zheng et al. [7]–[9] demonstrated
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that an eavesdropper may leverage the known or low entropy
symbols in the transmission to quickly train a decoding filter
and recovers the rest of the transmission, an attack equivalent
to the known-plaintext attack in cryptanalysis.
The root of this vulnerability is due to the fact that the
artificial noise only changes the quality of the receiving signal
but not the state of the channel. Specifically, the noise injected
by the transmitter (Alice) can lower the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) of the eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) channel. But it cannot
change the channel states between she and Eve or she and the
legitimate receiver (Bob). This limitation opens up a window
for the known-plaintext attack. Assuming the channel state
remains ergodic with its coherent time. Due to the increasingly
sophisticated digital modulation methods, Alice can transmit
a sequence of tens or hundreds of symbols within such a
short period. Although these symbols are buried deep under the
artificial noise, a fraction of known symbols among them would
allow Eve with multiple antennas to compute the channel state
information (CSI), using a common MIMO technique known
as least square (LS) channel estimation, which is robust against
channel noise. Once Eve estimated the CSI, she may use it to
equalize the channel and remove the artificial noise during the
rest of the coherent period.
Follow this line of reasoning, there are two ways to defend
against the known-plaintext attack, assuming Alice cannot
avoid transmitting known symbols. She can limit the number of
symbols to transmit within each coherent time period, which
limits the communication throughput. Or she can reduce the
coherent time to thwart the known-plaintext attack. However,
the coherent time is an intrinsic condition that depends on the
channel multipath and Doppler spread, both of which are not
subject to the manipulation of transmitting content. Therefore,
it would appear there are no cogent methods to defend against
the known-plaintext attack.
However, in this paper, we challenge this no-win scenario
and propose an orthogonal blinding based physical-layer se-
curity method immune to the known-plaintext attack: Channel-
Randomized Orthogonal Blinding (ROBin). ROBin leverages a
pattern reconfigurable antenna to vary the channel state at a per
symbol or per frame rate, resulting in an artificially created fast-
changing wireless channel unsuitable for the known-plaintext
attack, for which can be viewed as one of the proactive/dynamic
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defense (or moving target defense) mechanisms. To prevent
the antenna reconfiguration from affecting Bob, we design a
compressive sensing based algorithm for Alice to estimate the
angle-of-departure (AoD) distribution of the multipath environ-
ment and predict the CSI for a given reconfigurable antenna
pattern. Based on the predicted CSI, Alice can equalize the
channel for Bob via digital pre-coding before transmitting. As
a result, the main channel state appears stable to Bob but
randomly changing from Eve’s perspective.
We formally analyze the security of ROBin, by comparing
the mutual information between Alice’s transmission and Eve’s
reception, assuming the channel state has the Markov property
and Eve knows the symbols transmitted via historical antenna
modes but not the current one. The analysis shows that Eve
gains little advantage from knowing previous symbols (as
channel randomization reduces the channel correlation and
makes the current channel state more unpredictable). We im-
plement the key components of ROBin; validate our theoretical
analysis with extensive simulation and real-world experiments.
Empirical results show that our scheme can suppress Eve’s
attack success rate to the level of random guessing, even if
she knows all the symbols transmitted through other modes.
II. RELATED WORK
Physical-layer security was pioneered by Wyner’s work on
the wiretap channel [10], which leverages the channel advan-
tage for legitimate receivers over degraded eavesdroppers to
guarantee secure transmission over wireless channels. In [10],
the rate of secret communications is characterized by secrecy
capacity, which is shown to be the difference in the capacity
of the receiver and the eavesdropper. Following Wyner’s work,
numerous studies based on various channel models ranging
from basic Gaussian channels to complex MIMO wiretap
channels have been proposed later [11]–[17]. In particular,
Khisti et al. [16], [17] showed the secrecy capacity bounds
in the large antenna limit with full channel state information
(CSI) assumption. Their works reveal an important result that
the achievable secrecy capacity can be significantly affected by
the number of antennas of the eavesdropper. However, since
those theoretical works often make unrealistic assumptions such
as channel advantage, full channel knowledge, or independent
and identically channel distribution, they are rarely adopted to
evaluate the secrecy of real-world schemes.
On the other hand, various practical physical-layer secret
communication schemes have been proposed. One example
is the friendly jamming approach. Gollakota et al. prevented
unauthorized commands from being transmitted to implantable
medical devices (IMDs) in [18]. They assume that the attacker
equipped with MIMO is unable to separate the legitimate and
jamming signal, due to the close proximity between the jammer
and the data source. Similarly, Shen et al. [19] designed another
jamming technique where jamming signals are controlled with
secret keys, so that they are recoverable to authorized devices
but unpredictably interfering to unauthorized ones. The jammer
and the authorized device are very close to each other in both
schemes, and this design is found as vulnerable by Tippenhauer
et al. in [20]. When an attacker tactfully places her antenna
array, the transmitted data signal can be recovered by exploiting
the phase offsets between received signal components. Artificial
noise injection strategy [1]–[4] is another example [1]–[4], it
has drawn significant attention by the security community since
first proposed by Goel and Negi. However, it also relies on the
unrealistic assumption that the statistics of the eavesdropper’s
channel are known to the transmitter. Argyraki et al. in [6]
proposed a cooperative jamming strategy for group secret
agreement. By injecting artificial noise through beamforming,
a group of legitimate users are enable to create a shared
secret, that the eavesdropper obtains very little information.
However, this approach limits the number of antennas the
eavesdropper possesses, which can be vulnerable to powerful
eavesdroppers. On the other hand, Anand et al. proposed the or-
thogonal blinding scheme where no channel information about
the eavesdropper is required [5]. To defend against a single-
antenna eavesdropper, the transmitter injects artificial noise
into channels orthogonal to the legitimate receiver’s channel
so that the original signal intended for the receiver cannot
be recovered from the signal and noise mixture. However,
when the eavesdropper has multiple antennas, by exploiting the
known parts of the transmitted signal such as frame preambles,
Schulz et al. [7] successfully implemented a known-plaintext
attack against orthogonal blinding. With normalized least mean
square algorithms, an adaptive filter was trained to separate
transmitted messages from artificial noise.
The root cause of the vulnerability in orthogonal blinding
is that the channel is assumed to be stable during the whole
transmission period, so that the attacker is able to gather enough
plaintexts for filter training, and this flaw can be amended
with channel randomization approach. In the literature, the
channel randomization approach has been used for key gen-
eration, message confidentiality, and integrity protection. Aono
et al. [21] proposed a key generation and agreement scheme
that blocks the eavesdropper from generating the same key
as transceivers by increasing the fluctuation of the wireless
channel with a smart antenna. Hassanieh et al. [22] presented
a secret transmission scheme for RFIDs randomizing both
modulation and channel by rotating several directional antennas
at the transmitter. Different from this work, their scheme is
only applicable to single-antenna transmitters and does not
use pre-coding. To defend against active man-in-the-middle
attacks, Hou et al. [23] and Pan et al. [24] randomized the
wireless channel with a fan and a reconfigurable antenna
respectively to prevent online signal cancellation. All these
works show that channel randomization approach can be a
powerful tool to enhance physical-layer security. However, the
studies are still preliminary and a comprehensive scheme that is
MIMO-compatible and secure against multi-antenna attackers
is lacking.
III. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
Consider a MIMO-OFDM system shown in Fig. 1, where the
transmitter Alice aims at confidentially communicating with
the receiver Bob through a wireless channel HAB , with the
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Fig. 1: Our system model illustrating the transmitter Alice, the legitimate receiver Bob and the passive eavesdropper Eve, where
Alice is equipped with RA(s).
existence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. Denote the number
of antennas for Alice, Bob and Eve as na, nb and ne respec-
tively. The legitimate receiver Bob is equipped with regular
omnidirectional antenna(s) (OAs), while the eavesdropper Eve
can possess any types of antennas, including OAs, reconfig-
urable antenna(s) (RAs) and etc.. In particular, the transmit-
ter Alice is equipped with RAs for channel randomization
purpose, where an RA is an antenna capable of dynamically
reconfiguring its antenna currents or radiating edges in a
controlled and reversible manner [25]. Typically, an RA can
swiftly reconfigurable its antenna profile including radiation
pattern, polarization, frequency, and combinations of them. For
example, Rodrigo et al. [26] presented an RA that has thousand
of antenna modes and can be electronically switched within
microseconds. From the receiver’s perspective, the effect of the
antenna profile is part of the CSI. Hence we can incorporate the
impact of RA on the wireless channel into the channel model.
The wireless channel from Alice’s j-th antenna to a receiver’s
i-th antenna ((i, j)-th receive-transmit pair) can be captured by
a single complex number in the frequency domain, i.e. hi,j ,
and the full CSI of transceivers can be represented by an array
H with dimension nb × na. Then the received signal R with
dimension nb × ∗ can be expressed as:
R = H ·D + N (1)
where D and N represents the transmitted data and the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN), with dimension na×∗ and nb×
∗ respectively. For the channel model, we consider a multipath
channel. Recall that the effect of the antenna profile is also
part of the CSI, to distinguish, we separate the CSI into the
channel coefficient decided by the physical channel itself and
the antenna part. Assuming that the channel is composed with
P multipaths, denote the physical channel coefficient part of
hi,j as h
(phy)
i,j , then
h
(phy)
i,j =
P∑
l=1
Llαle
−jφl (2)
where Ll is the path loss of the l-th path, and αle−jφl is
its fading parameter, here αl and φl are the amplitude and
phase of the fading respectively. Similar to existing works
[5], [7], [9], the physical channel coefficient h(phy)i,j in our
model is fixed during the channel coherent time. Then the
multipath channel can be expressed with the distribution of
angle-of-departure (AoD). According to the multipath model, a
single transmission from the antenna propagates along multiple
paths before reaching the receiver. Each signal that travels
at a particular AoD along with different paths experiences
a different amount of attenuation and phase shifts. Then the
physical channel coefficient part expressed as (2) can be further
extended as the summation of the CSI over all the departure
directions, and only the CSI that in the direction of multipaths
is non-trivial. The distribution of CSI over all possible AoDs
is defined as the AoD distribution. Then,
h
(phy)
i,j =
D∑
d=1
ai,j(θd) (3)
where the angular space is discretized into D unique, equally
spaced angles {θ1, θ2, . . . , θD}, and ai,j is the AoD distribution
of (i, j)-th receive-transmit channel.
With RA, various antenna modes are associated with differ-
ent radiation patterns. When the antenna gain under antenna
mode u and angle-of-departure θl is denoted as G(u, θd), then
the CSI hi,j under antenna mode u can written as:
hi,j(u) =
D∑
d=1
G(u, θd)ai,j(θd) (4)
Same as [5], [7], [9], the channel from Alice to Bob (HAB)
is measured at Bob’s side and can be sent back to Alice through
an out-of-band (OOB) channel or rely on implicit feedback, but
HAB is unknown to Eve. And Eve’s can measure the channel
from Alice to her (HAE), and it is unknown to neither Alice
nor Bob.
IV. REVIEW OF ORTHOGONAL BLINDING
Orthogonal blinding is designed to achieve secure commu-
nication by injecting noise into channels orthogonal to the
main channel and corrupt the eavesdropper’s signal reception.
Though it is not the best possible achievable scheme for
physical layer security, as it does not require a priori key
exchange nor full channel knowledge, orthogonal blinding has
been widely considered as a promising candidate to provide
confidentiality during wireless transmission. However, it has
been proven vulnerable against multi-antenna eavesdropper ca-
pable of discerning the message from the noise. In this section,
we provide a brief review of orthogonal blinding scheme and
the cause of its vulnerabilities.
A. Transmitter-Side Precoding
The core technique behind orthogonal blinding is known
as transmitter-side precoding. To achieve secure transmission,
Alice stirs both message and artificial noise (AN) via precoding.
So Bob receives the pure message, and Eve receives the
mixture of the noise and message. Zero-forcing and orthogonal
blinding are two physical layer security schemes to achieved
by transmitter-side precoding.
In zero-forcing, Alice aims to transmit within the null-
space of Eve’s channel, which requires the full knowledge of
Eve’s channel. Such condition is not practical for a passive
eavesdropper. While in orthogonal blinding, Alice needs only
to know Bob’s channel and transmits the AN in the null-space
of Bob’s channel to prevent eavesdroppers from extracting the
data. Due to the orthogonality, Bob is not affected by the
AN. But any receiver, whose channel is different from Bob’s,
receives a mixture of the message and AN. If the AN in the
mixture is strong, the receiver cannot recover the message.
The channels orthogonal to Bob’s can be computed with the
Gram-Schmidt algorithm as mentioned in [5], [7], [9]. First,
Alice computes the projection matrix:
Hp = H
H
AB(HABH
H
AB)
−1HAB (5)
and randomly generates a complex uniform matrix H′AN with
dimension (na − nb)× na. Then the difference between H′AN
and the projection of H′AN is:
H
′′
AN = H
′
AN −H′AN ·Hp (6)
by normalizing this difference, we can obtain HAN :
HAN =
H
′′
AN
‖H′′AN‖
(7)
where each row in HAN is orthogonal to any other row in itself
and to every row in HAB .
Next, Alice precodes the message (DB) and artificial noise
(AN) with the pseudo-inverse of the matrix composed by HAB
and HAN , and obtain the transmitted signal D as:
D = FA
(
DB
AN
)
(8)
where FA is the transmit filter represented as:
FA =
(
HAB
HAN
)H ((
HAB
HAN
)(
HAB
HAN
)H )−1
(9)
Correspondingly, the received signal for Bob and Eve is:(
RB
RE
)
=
(
HAB
HAE
)
·D + N (10)
B. Known-Plaintext Attack
Anand et al. [5] showed that single antenna eavesdrop-
pers cannot recover the message with her reception, however,
Schulz and Zheng et al. [7], [9] showed that by exploiting
the known parts or low entropy parts of the transmitted sig-
nal, the known-plaintext or ciphertext-only attack is possible
in practice. Specifically, Schulz et al. introduced a practical
known-plaintext attack for orthogonal blinding scheme. Unlike
the typical assumption in the literature which assumes that
the transmitted signal is fully unknown to the eavesdropper,
Schulz argued that Eve can utilize the well-known protocols or
addresses fields to guess part of the transmitted signal, so that
some plaintext-ciphertext pairs are known to the eavesdropper,
which is similar to the known-plaintext attack in cryptography.
Then the eavesdropper can use the known plaintexts to train
an adaptive filter for AN suppression. Ideally, the receive filter
FE is:
FE = F
−1
A ·H−1AE (11)
In practice, Eve estimates FE as FˆE with some known plain-
texts DB through iterative process. That is, Eve minimizes the
mean square error between the estimated data and the known
plaintexts:
min
FˆE
E|DB − FˆE ·RE |2 (12)
There are several iterative training algorithms for this problem,
but in general, for a fixed transmit filter FA, multiple symbols
are required to obtain a good adaptive filter at Eve’s side due to
the iterative training procedure. In [7], even with good training
technique and parameter setting, 20− 30 training symbols are
required when the ratio of transmitted AN to data is fairly low.
V. ROBIN: CHANNEL-RANDOMIZED ORTHOGONAL
BLINDING
The vulnerability of preliminary orthogonal blinding results
from the unchanged main channel, which allows the eaves-
dropper to estimate it via known symbols and filter the AN
out. Actually, this flaw can be amended with the channel
randomization approach, which is to actively randomize the
wireless channel by introducing special antennas [21], [24],
antenna motions [22] or artificial channel disturbance [23].
Intuitively, when the wireless channel is rapidly randomized,
Eve can be blocked from gathering enough symbols for filter
training. However, Eve can also explore the correlation between
her channels and the main channel to estimate Bob’s channel
directly for message recovering. Results in [24], [27] showed
that there is a strong correlation between two channels when
the attacker is delicately positioned, and this correlation can be
reduced with channel randomization [24]. Hence, we propose
a channel-randomized orthogonal blinding scheme which can
be viewed as one of the proactive/dynamic defense (or moving
target defense) mechanisms, to defend against known-plaintext
attacks. We also show the benefits of reducing channel corre-
lation to system security with the proposed metric in Sec. VI,
which further supports our channel randomization approach.
A. Channel Prediction
When the physical wireless channel remains unchanged, we
randomize the wireless channel through rapid antenna mode
switching, however, when the main channel changes, a new
transmit filter is needed by Alice to guarantee the orthogonality
between the message and noise subspaces. Traditionally, the
main channel information HAB is measured at Bob’s side and
sent back to Alice through an OOB channel or relying on
implicit feedback. However, when the channel is randomized
frequently, it becomes too costly, which makes the channel
measurement a major challenge for orthogonal blinding based
schemes. To solve this problem, we introduce a compressive
sensing based channel prediction algorithm for Alice to cancel
the channel changing effect to Bob.
1) AoD Estimation: As the physical channel coefficient part
is assumed as unchanged within the channel coherent time, it
implies a stable AoD distribution correspondingly. To predict
the CSI under different antenna modes, the distribution of AoD
is estimated first to capture the physical wireless channel, and
the effect of the antenna is added as in (4) for CSI prediction.
2) Conventional AoD Estimation: Traditionally, the distri-
bution of AoD is estimated via MUSIC algorithm [28]. To
simplify, we describe it with a uniform linear array (ULA),
with M identical antenna elements arranged along a line with
uniform spacing. Assume that there are L multipath signals
S1, S2, . . . , SL arriving. The matrix representation of the re-
ceived signal at the array can be represented as:
J = AS + N (13)
where J is the M × 1 received signal, S is the L × 1 signal
source and A is the M × L steering vector matrix.
The basic idea of MUSIC algorithm is to implement eigen-
value decomposition of the received signal covariance matrix:
ΦJ = E[JJ
H ] (14)
= AΦSA
H + ΦN (15)
= QS
∑
QS
H + QN
∑
QN
H (16)
where ΦS and ΦN are the correlation matrix for the signal
and noise respectively. Decomposing (15) results in M eigen
values out of which the larger L eigenvalues correspond to
the multipath signals, where QS and QN are the basis of
signal and noise subspaces respectively. Then by exploiting
the orthogonality between the signal and noise subspaces, the
direction of the arrived angles can be represented as:
θMUSIC = argmin βH(θ)QNQNHβ(θ) (17)
However, as the MUSIC algorithm was mainly proposed for
radio direction finding, the distribution obtained from it is only
about the magnitude of CSI, which is not the AoD distribution
we need. Hence, this algorithm is not applicable to our problem.
3) Compressive AoD Estimation with RA: Intuitively, the
easiest way to estimate the AoD distribution for a given channel
is to transmit with D different antenna modes, so that we
can solve (4) directly. However, it is not practical to estimate
through this linear algebra approach due to large D (e.g. in our
case D = 360). Fortunately, by exploiting the sparsity of AoD
distribution, the problem is solvable even with a small number
of training modes.
Previous works [29], [30] have shown that for a typical
multipath environment, there are only 3-5 distinct directions
are dominant components. In other words, when we look into
the AoD distribution, only a small number of them contribute
significantly to the CSI. With this sparsity property, we can
recover the AoD distribution from only a small number of mea-
surements. Specifically, we use compressive sensing technique
[31] to estimate AoD distribution.
Compressive sensing is a sampling algorithm that capable
of recovering sparse signals with much fewer samples than
traditional sampling approaches. One of the basic problems is
to recover a signal x from a M×1 observation y, with a given
M ×N sensing basis Φ, where M < N and the signal x has
a sparse representation with a N × N representation basis Ψ
and N × 1 weighting coefficients s: x = Ψs. Mathematically
speaking, the problem is to get x/s from y = Φx = ΦΨs.
The problem is solvable when the largest correlation between
any two elements of Φ and Ψ is small, which is refereed to as
incoherence [31].
For our problem, since the AoD distribution a(·) is sparse
itself, our presentation basis degrades to an identity matrix, but
we can still use the compressive sensing formulation to solve
it. When training modes are randomly selected, the incoherence
condition is roughly satisfied and the AoD distribution of (i, j)-
th receive-transmit channel can be recovered from the following
compressive sensing formulation:
ai,j = argmin ||ai,j(θ)||1
s.t. hi,j(u) =
D∑
d=1
G(u, θd)ai,j(θd), 1 ≤ u ≤ U
(18)
where ‖ · ‖1 represents the L1 norm and U  D are the
total number of antenna modes needed for AoD distribution
recovery. Note that, Xie et al. presented an estimation algorithm
of AoA distribution based on compressive sensing in [32].
However, since they use antenna array, the CSI they use for
estimation is the composite CSI instead of the one between
each receive-transmit antenna pair.
4) Channel Prediction: Once the AoD distribution is esti-
mated with the above compressive sensing formulation, the CSI
hi,j under any given antenna mode can be predicted with (4).
When the AoD distribution of every CSI element in the main
channel is estimated, the whole matrix HAB can be predicted
correspondingly. Note that, the physical wireless channel is
stable only within the channel coherent time, once the physical
channel changes, a new round of AoD distribution estimation is
required. In practice, since carrier frequency offset or accurate
external clocks such as GPS clocks can eliminate the impact
of frequency and phase offset, the channel coherent time can
be long. Then the channel prediction is applicable, and it
reduces the overhead for channel sounding comparing with the
orthogonal blinding scheme.
B. Secure Transmission Scheme
In short, our RA based secure transmission scheme comprises
two phases that we summarize hereunder, and for clarification,
we denote the set of whole antenna modes, training modes, and
transmitting modes as S, S1, S2 respectively.
1. Training phase: (a) Alice selects a certain number of
antenna modes as training modes (S1). For each training mode
u ∈ S1, several pilots are sent for each receive-transmit antenna
pair (i, j) with time-division multiplexing;
(b) Bob measures the corresponding CSI hi,j(u) and shares
it with Alice through OOB or implicit feedback;
(c) Alice estimates the corresponding AoD distribution fol-
lowing (18) and gets ai,j .
2. Secure transmission phase: (a) Alice randomly selects a
set of antenna modes from the complement of S1 as transmit-
ting modes (S2 ⊆ S\S1);
(b) For each transmitting mode v ∈ S2, Alice predicts the
corresponding channel matrix to Bob as HˆAB(v) following (4),
then the transmit filter FA is computed based on the predicted
HˆAB(v) following (9);
(c) Alice transmits the message DB and AN as in (8). For
each packet, Alice uses a different mode randomly chosen from
above, and Bob demodulates/decodes the received signal to get
the messages from the packets directly.
Note that, the training phase needs to be executed once
for every channel coherent time period (which is inversely
proportional to the maximum Doppler spread of the physical
channel). During the secure transmission phase, Alice does not
need to include any pilots/preamble in the packets due to the
transmit filter that cancels the channel effect to Bob.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we formally analyze the security properties
of ROBin. To model ROBin, we define the CSI of a wireless
channel, H(·) as a function of discrete-time t and antenna
mode u. Under this definition, the CSI in ROBin behaves as
a function H (t, u(t)), where u changes for each time step.
We further assume that a sequence of H (t, u(t))s, forms a
Markov chain [33], such that H (T, u(T )) is independent of
past CSIs, {H (t, u(t)) | t < T − 1}, given H (T−1, u(T−1)).
To quantify the security of ROBin, we derive the conditional
mutual information between Eve’s receiving signal at time
T , RE(T ), and the pre-blinding message, DB(T ), assum-
ing Eve knows all previous CSIs between Alice and Bob,
{HAB (t, u(t)) | t = 0, ..., T−1}, and all CSIs between Alice
and herself, {HAE (t, u(t)) | t = 0, ..., T} (Sec. VI-A). Finally,
we verify the correctness of the proposed metric and explain
the insights gained from the analytical results (Sec. VI-B).
A. Secrecy Leakage as Conditional Mutual Information
To quantify eavesdropper’s capacity under known-plaintext
attacks in a way congruence with cryptanalysis, we consider
the secrecy leakage as the conditional mutual information be-
tween the Eve’s receiving signal and the pre-blinding message,
given Eve has full knowledge of all previous CSIs via known
symbols. That is, we assume that, as t = T , all the previously
transmitted symbols, D(t), t = 0, ..., T−1, are known to Eve,
which allows Eve to compute HAB(t, u(t)), t = 0, ..., T−1.
Let H(T ) defines a set of previous CSIs up to time T:
H(T ) = {H (t, u(t)) | t = 0, ..., T} . (19)
Assuming HAE(T ) and HAB(T −1) are known to Eve. The
secrecy leakage is defined as a conditional mutual information:
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )) (20)
For simplicity, we first consider a single antenna system, in
which H (t, u(t)) reduces to a scalar function h (t, u(t)). and
the pre-coding filter becomes the inverse of the main channel,
e.g., FA(T ) = h−1AB (T, u(T )). Note that all derivations below
also apply to MIMO system, which we will discuss later. The
received signal at Eve’s side is:
RE(T ) = hAE (T, u(T ))
(
h−1AB (T, u(T ))DB(T )
)
+ N
, h−1AB (T, u(T ))DB(T ) + N,
after Eve equalizes hAE (T, u(T )). Omitting N, Eq. (20)
expands to
I
(
DB(T );h
−1
AB (T, u(T ))DB(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
)
To simplify the equation above, consider the conditional proba-
bility of hAB (T, u(T )) given HAB(T −1). Due to the Markov
property,
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | HAB(T − 1)] =
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | hAB (T − 1, u(T − 1))] .
As for the conditional probability of hAB (T, u(T )) given
HAE(T ). Although hAB (t, u(t)) and hAE (t, u(t)) are mostly
independent, they are correlated at the same time step, since the
antenna pattern is the same for hAB(u) and hAE(u), resulting
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | HAE(T )] =
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | hAE (T, u(T ))] .
Based on these conditions, we have the following Theorem:
Theorem VI.1. Assuming the wireless channel has the Markov
property, the secrecy leakage of ROBin can be simplified as1:
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )) =
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | hAB (T − 1, u(T − 1)) ,
hAE (T − 1, u(T − 1)) ,
hAE (T, u(T ))) =
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | δHABE(T )) , (21)
where
δHABE(T ) = { hAB (T − 1, u(T − 1)) ,
hAE (T − 1, u(T − 1)) ,
hAE (T, u(T )) }
This simplification allows us to calculate the numerical
secrecy leakage when all the possible values of discretize CSI
are in a small range. Next we use numerical results to show the
relationship between channel correlation and privacy leakage.
B. Correctness and Insights
1) Single-Antenna Eavesdropper: Alice can apply a reduced
ROBin scheme without orthogonal blinding in a single-input
and single-output (SISO) system, with Bob and Eve hav-
ing one regular antenna and Alice having one reconfigurable
antenna. To calculate the secrecy leakage, we first generate
the CSI with the truncated Gaussian distribution in the range
of (−2, 2), then we normalize its real (imaginary) part into
1The proof of this Theorem is in Appendix
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Fig. 2: Secrecy leakage over the channel correlation coefficient
between HAB and HAB .
four values, i.e. Re[δHABE(T )] ∈ {±1.5,±0.5}. And for
the message we consider 4QAM, namely that DB(T ) =
x ∈ {±1 + j,±1 − j}, then the entropy of the message is
H(DB(T )) = 2. and Re[RE(T )] ∈ {±1.5,±0.5}, |RE(T )| =
16, |(DB(T ),RE(T ), δHABE(T ))| = 256 × 210 correspond-
ingly. Hence we set the number of the samples to 30 million,
which is about 100 times of |(DB(T ),RE(T ), δHABE(T ))|.
The calculated Eq. 21 versus correlation coefficient between
HAB and HAB is shown in Fig. 2.
We can observe that the leakage increases with the increase
of the correlation coefficient between HAB and HAB , in other
words, the information the eavesdropper gained decreases with
the decrease of the correlation between HAB and HAB . This
result quantitatively verifies the motivation of our channel
randomization strategy: the system becomes more secure after
reducing the correlation between the two channels to the
receiver and the eavesdropper. And results in [24] shown that a
reconfigurable antenna is capable of decreasing the correlation
of two channels. Hence introducing a reconfigurable antenna
to the system brings us two benefits: actively randomizing the
wireless channel and reducing correlations among channels.
2) Multi-Antenna Eavesdropper: Alice can apply the full
ROBin scheme with orthogonal blinding in a multi-input and
single-output (MISO) or multi-input and multi-output (MIMO)
system. Assume Eve has multiple antennas. For a given antenna
mode, if the number of known symbols is less than the number
of Alice’s antennas na, Eve cannot find a unique decoding
filter, because the least square problem for the LS channel
estimation is underdetermined. However, the iterative decoding
filter training process still provides Eve partial information
about the message. And we use SER to evaluate this leakage in
the simulation. When the number of known symbols is greater
than na, the problem becomes overdetermined and allows Eve
to identify the correct decoding filter. Nevertheless, as the
number of known symbols do not accumulate when Alice
reuses the same antenna mode at different channel coherent
periods, as long as Alice switches the antenna mode faster than
the duration of na symbols, the secrecy leakage of our scheme
is low regardless of the number of antennas Eve has.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme
under the practical known-plaintext attack with both simulation
and real-world experiments. We start with the overview of
simulation setup, and investigate the effects of various pa-
rameters. With simulation, we can cover a wide parameter
range and establish the operating environment for the known-
plaintext attack with a MIMO eavesdropper. Then with an
implementation using USRP platform and a rotating RA, we
validate the simulation results via experiments.
A. Customized Reconfigurable Antenna
For the channel randomization purpose, we prefer RAs with
distinct radiation patterns across different antenna modes. There
are different types of RAs in the literature [25], [34], however,
most of them are designed for communication purpose that only
steer to several directions, which results in similar radiation
patterns over antenna modes and makes them unsuitable for
channel randomization purpose. To better evaluate our ROBin
scheme, we build our own RA by rotating a log periodic
antenna manufactured by Ettus Research [35]. We first measure
all the design parameters for the given log periodic antenna,
including arm width, arm spacing and etc., then its radiation
pattern is simulated using MALTAB antenna toolbox and
illustrated in Fig. 3i. In the simulation, we rotate the antenna
every one degree, so that we have 360 antennas modes in total.
And in practice, the rotator is constructed with a motor and
a microcontroller, to rotate the antenna agilely to an arbitrary
angle in the azimuth plane. The rotator is illustrated in Fig.
3h. Note that, we can have various antenna configurations at
Alice’s side when Alice has multiple antennas in general, e.g.
Alice can enrich antenna patterns by varying the gain level
of each antenna, which can be achieved with power allocation
among RF chains. Also, Alice can have more antennas than
use and randomly selects one among them for transmission,
or randomize the power ratio among antennas to introduce
additional randomness to wireless channels as in [22].
B. Simulation Setup
As described in the system model, Alice, Bob and Eve
are multi-antenna users with OFDM transmitters. W.l.o.g, we
focus our simulation on a setup where Alice has two given
log periodic antennas, Bob and Eve have one and two omni-
directional antenna(sTFor data transmission, the 30MHz wide
AWGN channel is split into 48 equally spaced sub-channels,
and the OFDM frames contain 192 symbols for each sub-
channel. To evaluate the effect of Alice’s AN, we vary the
ratio of AN to the transmitted data signal, namely that Noise
to Data Ratio (NDR). With fixed transmit power, the power for
data signal is:
D =
1
NDR + 1
(
DB
NDR · AN
)
(22)
We simulate 100 different environment settings, where five
scatters are put for each of them and the data signal are
transmitted as 4-QAM symbols. The distance from Eve to Bob
is set as 150cm, which is 12 times of the signal wavelength. For
all the simulations, we consider a more practical eavesdropper
than that in theoretical analysis, where not all the historical
data signal are known to the eavesdropper. Then we define the
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Fig. 3: From top to bottom, left to right: (a) SER of Bob and Eve over the number of training modes. SNR = 25dB; NDR = 1.
(b) SER of Bob over Alice’s NDR for different SNRs, with 20 training modes. (c) Eve’s SER over the number of iterations; SNR
= 25dB; various NDR. (d) Eve’s SER over the number of iterations. NDR = 1; various SNR. (e) Eve’s SER over the number
of iterations; SNR = 25dB; NDR = 1; various antenna switching period. (f) Azimuth CSI magnitude distribution estimated with
compressive sensing algorithm. (g) SER of Bob and Eve over the number of training mode based on the real-world channel data.
(h) Real-world rotator. (i) Radiation pattern of the RA. (j) Real-world experiment setup. (k) Geometry of the setup.
switching period T of RA based on an OFDM frame, and 120
frames are sent during the channel coherent time, hence we
have T ∈ [1, 120]. For each frame, the attacker is assumed
to obtain two symbols. Then if T = 10, it means that the
transmission mode changes every ten packets, hence for a given
transmit filter (computed from the given transmission mode),
the attacker has 20 known symbols for filter training.
C. Effect of the number of training modes
Since the estimation of the AoD distribution is based on
compressive sensing in ROBin, theoretically, the more training
modes we use, the more precise the estimation will be. Fig. 3a
illustrates the SER of Bob and Eve over the number of training
modes, obtained under ROBin and orthogonal blinding. Here to
better show the impact of channel prediction to Bob’s SER, we
do not change the antenna mode during transmission, which is
to set T = 120, then the only difference of these two schemes is
that ROBin computes the transmit filter based on the predicted
channel, while orthogonal blinding uses the measured channel
matrix obtained from channel sounding. From Fig. 3a we can
see that there is a gap between Bob’s SER obtained from two
schemes, which is caused by the imperfect channel prediction
and the missing channel sounding. However, it decreases with
the number of training modes as expected, and when 20 training
modes are used, Bob’s SER is small enough for communication.
On the other hand, Eve’s SER obtained after 240 iterations is
quite stable under the different number of training modes, this
is because the effect of the transmit filter and artificial noise
are both filtered out by Eve’s receive filter.
D. Effect of artificial noise and channel noise to Bob
Fig. 3b shows Bob’s SER with orthogonal blinding and
ROBin, at this time the antenna switching period is set as
T = 6, hence 20 transmission modes are used under a given
environmental setting. From Fig. 3b, we can see that Bob’s SER
decreases as SNR increases under both schemes. Especially,
both SNR and NDR have significant impacts on Bob’s SER
for orthogonal blinding. In contrast, the increase of SNR does
not bring much benefit to Bob’s SER for ROBin, since Bob’s
SER is dominated by the precise of channel prediction. Due
to the imperfect channel prediction, part of the artificial noise
is leaked to Bob’s channel, which increases Bob’s SER. Fortu-
nately, as long as the NDR is not too large, the communication
quality is still guaranteed. For instance, when SNR = 25dB and
NDR = 2, Bob can still achieve an average SER of 1.1×10−3.
E. Effect of artificial noise and channel noise to Eve
Theoretically, the higher the NDR is, the higher is the SER
on Eve’s side. Here we set the antenna switching period as
T = 60 to provide Eve some advantages. In Fig. 3c, we
illustrate how Alice’s NDR affects Eve’s performance. As we
expected, Eve’s SER decreases with the increase of NDR.
It is worth noticing that, when the power of artificial noise
is not too strong, NDR ≤ 4 for instance, we can see that
Eve’s SER has an obvious reduction with the iterative process;
whereas, as the artificial noise becomes stronger, even if the
number of iterations increases, the decrease of Eve’s SER is
not significant. Besides, in Fig. 3d we illustrate how SNR
affects Eve’s SER. The effect of channel noise to Eve’s SER is
much weaker than that to Bob’s SER, no significant variation
for Eve’s SER with the increase of SNR. Hence we can
conclude that Eve’s attack performance is mainly constrained
by the power of artificial noise that Alice sent. And there is
a tradeoff between the system secrecy (Eve’s SER) and the
communication quality (Bob’s SER) when injecting artificial
noise to the channel.
F. Effect of switching period to Eve
Intuitively, the faster the antenna switches, the higher is
Eve’s SER. In Fig. 3e, we show Eve’s SER over the antenna
switching period. As we expect, Eve’s SER decreases as T
increases. When T = 60, it is the best case for Eve under
ROBin scheme in Fig. 3e, we can see that Eve’s SER (0.4047)
is still fairly high. To quantify ROBin’s security improvement,
we compute the difference between Eve’s SER in ROBin and
in orthogonal blinding and normalize it with Eve’s SER in the
worst case, e.g., the SER of random guessing. For instance,
when Alice transmits QPSK (4QAM) symbols, we compute:
(SERROBin − SEROB)/0.75. The result shows we can elevate
the eavesdropper’s SER by 46% under 4-QAM modulation.
When the antenna mode changes rapidly, especially for T = 1,
we suppress Eve’s attack success rate to the level of random
guessing. Finally, we vary the number of known symbols in
each frame from 2 to 20. And the result in Fig. 3e shows that
Eve’s SER does not fluctuate much due to the convergence of
the algorithm.
TABLE I: Secrecy leakage computed with real-world CSI
|S1| 10 20 30 40
Secrecy Leakage 0.36 0.23 0.22 0.21
G. Effect of real-world channels
We rotate the RA with the platform in Fig. 3h for the real-
world CSI measurement in 2.6HGz. In the experiment, each of
our OFDM frames contains 320 symbols and lasts for 0.08s.
We collect the CSI data for about 60 seconds and change mode
every 1/18 seconds, which means the antenna switching period
is less than the duration of a frame. To facilitate our simulation
process, we set the antenna switching period to T = 1 while
simulating. Based on the measuerd CSI, we first show the
accuracy of the AoD estimation with 40 training modes in
3f. Observed that the predicted and measured CSI are similar
for most of antennas modes, and our analysis result shows
that the average prediction error decreases with the increase
of training modes, which validates the effectiveness of our
compressive sensing based AoD estimation algorithm. For all
the parameters presented in simulations, we only show the SER
of Bob and Eve over the number of training modes due to the
page limitation. Observed that Fig. 3f shows a similar trend as
in Fig. 3a, which indicates the consistency of our simulation
and implementation. The secrecy we defined in Sec. VI is
calculated with the measured CSI and shown in Table I, where
|S1| is the number of training modes. We can see that the
secrecy leakage is low, however, it is nonzero though the SER
of Eve is close to random guessing. This is because the secrecy
leakage considers the temporal and spatial correlations of the
main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, while the known-
plaintext attack strategy only utilizes the temporal correlation
of the main channel.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an orthogonal blinding based secret
transmission scheme, which is resistant to known-plaintext
attack by leveraging reconfigurable antennas to rapidly ran-
domize the channel state during transmission. We propose
a compressive sensing based AoD estimation algorithm and
predict Alice-Bob channel under arbitrary antenna modes. We
formally analyze the secrecy leakage using conditional mutual
information, which is applicable to both single and multi-
antenna eavesdroppers. We show that the secrecy leakage de-
creases with less channel correlation created by artificial chan-
nel randomization. We conduct extensive simulations and real-
world experiments to evaluate its performance. Results show
that, the communication quality between Alice and Bob remains
acceptable, whereas the randomized channel can successfully
prevent Eve from launching the known-plaintext attack even
if all the historical symbols are known. In the future, we will
study other better practical alternatives to orthogonal blinding
and analyze the security using secrecy capacity based notions.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem VI.1.
Proof. To prove Theorem VI.1., which states
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )) =
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | HABE (T − 2) , δHABE(T )) =
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | δHABE(T )) ,
where
HABE(T − 2) = { HAB (T − 2) , HAE (T − 2)}
δHABE(T ) = { hAB (T − 1, u(T − 1)) ,
hAE (T − 1, u(T − 1)) ,
hAE (T, u(T )) }
itis equivalent to prove that given δHABE(T ), HABE(T − 2)
and (DB(T ),RE(T )) are conditionally independent. Since the
messages DB are independent from all the CSI information,
and RE(T ) is a function of DB(T ) and h−1AB (T, u(T )) plus
some independent additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN),
it is similar to prove that given δHABE(T ), HABE(T − 2)
and h−1AB(T, u(T )) are conditionally independent, based on the
Markov property.
Recall the Markov property of the channels:
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | HAB(T − 1)] =
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | hAB (T − 1, u(T − 1))] .
and
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | HAE(T )] =
Pr [hAB (T, u(T )) | hAE (T, u(T ))]
To simplify, we denote X1 = HAB(T − 2), X2 = hAB(T −
1, u(T − 1)), X3 = hAB(T, u(T )), and similarly define Y for
channel A-E. Then the Markov property can be rewritten as:
Pr(X3|X1, X2) = Pr(X3|X2)
Pr(X3|Y1, Y2, Y3) = Pr(X3|Y3)
which is illustrated below:
X1 −→ X2 −→ X3xy xy xy
Y1 −→ Y2 −→ Y3
And the CSI can be represented with X and Y in a simpler
way as:
HABE(T − 2) = { X1, Y1 }
δHABE(T ) = { X2, Y2, Y3 }
h−1AB (T, u(T )) = X
−1
3
Hence our problem is equivalent to prove that given
(X2, Y2, Y3), (X1, Y1) and X3 (which is equivalent to X−13 )
are conditionally independent. Then we begin with
Pr(X1, Y1, X3|X2, Y2, Y3)
=Pr(X3|X2, Y2, Y3) Pr(X1, Y1|X2, Y2, X3, Y3) (23a)
(23a) is obtained by expressing the joint probability with the
conditional probability, then we focus on simplifying its last
term, for which we look at:
Pr(X3, Y3|X1, X2, Y1, Y2)
=Pr(X3|X1, X2, Y1, Y2) Pr(Y3|X1, X2, Y1, Y2, X3) (24a)
=Pr(X3|X2) Pr(Y3|Y2, X3) (24b)
=Pr(X3|X2, Y2) Pr(Y3|X2, Y2, X3) (24c)
=Pr(X3, Y3|X2, Y2) (24d)
Similarly, (24a) is obtained by expressing the joint probability
with the conditional probability. With Markov property of the
channels, it is further simplified to (24b). Then we can add more
conditional independent variables to it and get (24c), which
equals to (24d). (24d) implies that given (X2, Y2), (X1, Y1) and
(X3, Y3) are conditionally independent. Then back to (23a), we
have
Pr(X1, Y1, X3|X2, Y2, Y3)
=Pr(X3|X2, Y2, Y3) Pr(X1, Y1|X2, Y2, X3, Y3) (25a)
=Pr(X3|X2, Y2, Y3) Pr(X1, Y1|X2, Y2) (25b)
=Pr(X3|X2, Y2, Y3) Pr(X1, Y1|X2, Y2, Y3) (25c)
which means given (X2, Y2, Y3), X3 and (X1, Y1) are condi-
tionally independent. Since X−13 is a function of X3, then this
conditional independence still holds when we replace X3 with
X−13 , which implies:
Pr(X−13 |X1, Y1, X2, Y2, Y3) = Pr(X−13 |X2, Y2, Y3) (26)
Then we reverse X , Y in (26) back to the CSI, which gives
us:
Pr
[
h−1AB (T, u(T )) |HABE(T − 2), δHABE(T )
]
=
Pr
[
h−1AB (T, u(T )) |HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
]
=
Pr
[
h−1AB (T, u(T )) |δHABE(T )
]
(27)
To compute I (DB(T );RE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )),
we ignore the AWGN and consider
Pr
(
DB(T ); RˆE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
)
first, where
RˆE(T ) = h
−1
AB((T, u(T ))DB(T ).
Pr
(
DB(T ), RˆE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
)
=Pr
(
DB(T ), h
−1
AB (T, u(T )) =
RˆE(T )
DB(T )
| HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
)
(28a)
=Pr (DB(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T ))
× Pr
(
h−1AB (T, u(T )) =
RˆE(T )
DB(T )
| HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
)
(28b)
=Pr (DB(T ) | HABE(T ))
× Pr
(
h−1AB (T, u(T )) =
RˆE(T )
DB(T )
| δHABE(T )
)
(28c)
=Pr
(
DB(T ), RˆE(T ) | δHABE(T )
)
(28d)
With the fact that messages are independent from all the
CSI information, we can get (28b), and meanwhile get rid of
HABE(T − 2) from DB’s condition, which gives us the first
term of (28c), and with (27) we get the second term of (28c).
Then by converting conditional probability to joint probability,
we get (28d). Since the AWGN is independent from every term
of above equations, we can add it into RˆE and get RE while
above results still holds.
So far, we have proved that
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )) =
I (DB(T );RE(T ) | δHABE(T ))
for single antenna system. Next, we present the approach to
extend it to MIMO. Note that, for the MIMO system, each
element in the Markov chain becomes the channel matrix.
Similarly,
Pr
(
DB(T ), RˆE(T ) | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
)
=Pr
(
DB(T ),H
−1
AB (T, u(T )) ∈ Γ | HAB(T − 1),HAE(T )
)
(29a)
where
Γ = {H−1AB (T, u(T )) ∈ Γ, s.t. RˆE(T ) = H−1AB(T, u(T ))DB(T )}
and represents a set of matrices where its element is a possible
solution for H−1AB (T, u(T )). Then we can eliminateHABE(T−
2) with similar procedures from Eq. (28b) to Eq. (28d).
